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THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR IN
THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION INDUSTRY
By JOSEPH P. MULHOLLAND

Washington: Federal Trade Commission, 1979. Pp. 166.
This study is a staff report prepared by the Bureau of Economics
of the Federal Trade Commission. It undertakes to evaluate the competitive potential of the natural gas producing industry, using primarily data provided by the FTC's Natural Gas Survey Questionnaire
issued in March, 1975. Most of the analysis is of seller structure in
national and regional markets, but one chapter undertakes a behavioral analysis of major companies in relation to possible withholding
of gas in the form of producible but shut-in leases. The report concludes, in general, that the natural gas producing industry is capable
of workable competition and that federal price regulation is not
necessary to control or offset monopolistic tendencies.
The report's more specific findings are as follows:
1. There is not a high degree of concentration in the natural gas
producing industry. The concentration ratios are similar to the
median for all manufacturing and below those usually taken to indicate monopolistic potential.
2. The degree of integration of the production sector with interstate pipelines is low. Consequently, gas producers confront buyers
who generally are independent and who possess substantial bargaining power stemming from a pipeline network giving access to different fields over a wide geographical area.
3. Although joint venture activity in the industry, particularly on
the Outer Continental Shelf, is extensive and increasing, it does not
appear to create a competitive problem. Joint venture associations
among the larger producers have been diverse and of a temporary
nature.
4. The Interior Department can help stimulate competitive behavior through its control of the supply of land for leasing, the
timing of development-production activities, the manner of lease bidding and the limitation of joint bidding by the largest operators.
5. Ownership patterns in nonproducing leases on the OCS give no
evidence of attempts at monopolistic supply control by the major
producers.
One would expect concentration ratios to be relatively low in the
onshore sector of the natural gas producing industry due to the many
firms in it (5,000 estimated by the author) and the relative absence
of major barriers to leasing, exploration and development. One
would expect substantially higher ratios on the OCS, where the bar-
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riers in the form of large lease bonuses, high drilling costs and unlimited liability for oil spills are greater. The ratios on the OCS were
high in 1960, but they have steadily declined over the years since and
as of 1974 were scarcely higher than those onshore. The author
attributes the downward trend in the OCS ratios to increase in the
number of tracts offered for lease, increase in the use of joint ventures, particularly by the smaller firms, and purchaser adaptations
(backward integration) to the natural gas shortage.
The analysis of joint ventures and their effect on competitive
potential is of special interest in view of the fact that joint ventures
now account for over 80 percent of total bonus payments in OCS
leasing. On the one hand they act as temporary and specialized "mergers" that may reduce competition; on the other hand they permit
small firms to overcome the major barriers to entry on the OtS and
thereby increase competition. The question is, which of these effects
dominates? The author's analysis of the data and associated theoretical reasoning suggest that the latter effect dominates. He concludes,
more specifically, that the negative association between firm size and
the use of joint ventures is inconsistent with anticompetitive intent
by the major producers, and that joint venture bidding patterns do
not reveal significant instances of de facto merger among OCS producers.
In response to the frequent allegation that major firms have withheld natural gas from the market in order to force up prices, the
report concludes from the evidence of ownership of producible shutin leases that, if anything, the contrary is true. The larger producers
have relatively fewer shut-in leases and appear to initiate production
on their leases at a somewhat faster rate than smaller producers.
The analysis supporting the report's conclusions is done with competence and imagination. It is balanced, restrained in language and
evidently free of bias and preconceptions. It invites respect and
should go a long way in easing fears about the competitiveness of the
natural gas producing industry. The report is recommended reading
for all students of the energy sector of the economy.
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